We develop an infinite-horizon dynamic search model to understand education-job mismatches in the labor markets where job seekers face three different types of labor markets based on their minimum educational requirements. Using a new data set, we find that our model matches the U.S. data well when we introduce heterogeneity through wage distributions. We find that regardless of the general unemployment level, education-job mismatches can exist due to the dynamics within the job markets. Highly educated job seekers may settle for jobs below their education level due to the frictions in the job market even when the unemployment is low, leading to a high degree of overeducation in the labor market and crowding out job seekers who have lower level of education. This means many jobs could be filled by overqualified candidates leading to possible inefficiencies in the economy. We use counterfactual experiments to show that even when the general unemployment level is kept constant, if the conditions within different job market types change, overeducation levels may increase or decrease dramatically.
Introduction
According to BLS, as of 2010 over 317,000 waiters and waitresses have college degrees along with 80,000 bartenders and over 18,000 parking lot attendants. Over 8,000 of the waiters and waitresses have doctoral and professional degrees. Around 17,000,000 Americans with college degrees are working in occupations that require less than the skill levels associated with a bachelor's degree according to BLS.
1
Even though we also see cases where job seekers take jobs that require more than the skill levels associated with their educational background, the trend is pretty much on the overeducation side. More and more we are seeing people settling for jobs that are below their educational level. There are many horror stories involving especially natural sciences Phds living most of their lives moving from one place to another looking for a measly postdoc position.
Contrary to the popular claim that we need more scientists the actual data and job market clearly shows that there are way too many scientists.
2
Apart from the meaning of education in the Aristotle's sense, this brings an important question to mind. Do we really need so many people to spend their time and money to get degrees where there is no monetary value in the near or any foreseeable future? Obviously, any type of education has an immense social and personal value regardless of the fact whether you get a job as a result of that or not. We do want to be in an educated society, we do want to be surrounded by educated people. However, this type of education can easily be achieved without making people go through many years of degree chasing. In this paper we are interested in the relationship between job market conditions and educational attainment by the general population. More interestingly we want to find an answer for the latest trend in the U.S. job market: Increasing number of workers settling for jobs below their educational attainment level. This paper develops an infinite horizon dynamic search model to understand the effect 1 For a more detailed discussion please check http://chronicle.com/blogs/innovations/why-did-17-million-students-go-to-college/27634
2 For a very a nice expose that details this problem in natural sciences please read physicist Jonathan Katz's opinion page posted at http://wuphys.wustl.edu/ katz/scientist.html.
of job market conditions on the choice of educational attainment. In our model educational attainment is exogenous but it determines an agent's skill level. There has been many studies trying to match skill level to job market. However, the biggest problems with these studies is that it's pretty difficult to measure one's true skill level. There are some surveys asking questions about skill levels but that never truly identifies the skill level. In the absence of such data the best thing we can do is to tie skill level to educational attainment.
The model we introduce have four key features. First it divides the labor market into three segments. The segments are defined based on the minimum education level a worker is supposed to have to be able to work in that segment. We assume that worker's education is observable and the jobs posted by firms specify the minimal educational attainment required on prospective candidates. Prospective candidates are also divided into three segments based on their educational attainment.
Second feature is that due to various frictions in the labor market we may see mismatches between jobs and workers. In other words we allow workers to search for any job regardless of the minimum educational attainment requirement. This is something we see in every direction in the job market. We see that someone with a masters degree taking a job that would require only a high school degree. We also see someone with high a school degree working at a job that would usually require a masters degree. Our model allows the workers to search in any of these markets and firms to be matched with any type of workers.
Third feature is we rank these segments based on their wage distributions, job offer probabilities and assume that wage distributions and job offer probabilities in each segment abides by this ranking. This allows us to introduce possible frictions into our model that may explain mismatches in job market. The intuition is if relative wages and job offer probabilities are better comparatively in a lower ranking market then agents may easily choose to work in that market rather than looking for a job in a tougher environment, this would lead to overeducation.
The last feature of this paper is the novel use of existing data. Observing the skill level is pretty hard. The data that we use allows us to observe the skill level of workers through their education. We also observe the respondents' job and their wages. We are also able to match these jobs with BLS defined minimum educational requirements for occupations. This allows us to do a thorough analysis of the reasons for overeducation as observed in Table 2 . The data also let us observe various other variables of the respondents which actually explains quite a bit of variation in wage differentials and job offer probabilities across skill levels.
Counterfactuals are conducted to study the effect of changes within different job market segments on job mismatches. Since we assume wage distributions and job offer probabilities are exogenous in each segment we are able to compare the benchmark data against counterfactuals by varying wage distributions and job offer probabilities.
We find that regardless of general unemployment level if the relative conditions within each segment change then we may observe huge variation in overeducation levels in the market. This is a very important result. What this basically say is that if the dynamics within the job market change in an unfavorable fashion then we may see mismatches easily even if we are at zero unemployment level. This would obviously lead to various inefficiencies. More importantly, even if we do solve the unemployment problem for the entire market if we don't have the right type of jobs for each candidate we should expect mismatches happening leading to possible frictions and problems in the future.
There are quite a few studies looking at skill mismatch rather than education mismatch in US. Measuring the skill mismatch is significantly harder than our task. In our case since all jobs have a predefined minimum education requirement all we need to do is look at the data available from Current Population Survey. Measuring skill mismatch however requires true knowledge of skills of employees and skill required by the jobs. In recent studies, rather than looking at skill mismatches some authors have looked at the difference between the number of jobs in a sector and number of workers looking for a job in that sector. Shimer • Overeducation: A worker's years of schooling is greater than the minimum number of years required for the job.
• Proper Match: A worker's years of schooling is equal to the minimum number of years required for the job.
• Undereducation: A worker's years of schooling is less than the minimum number of years required for the job. the mismatch. Regardless of how it is measured, mismatches cause losses to both individual workers and firms. They cause losses to workers in reduced wages, career interruptions, and reduced job satisfaction. Moreover, they cause losses to firms in reduced productivity. Both together cause a restricted growth rate for whole economy.
On the other hand, Cuadras-Morato and Mateos-Planas (2006) (22) try to understand the skill bias and employment frictions. They develop an equilibrium search and matching model of the labor market where education is endogenous. This is probably the closest paper to our work in terms of data usage. They find that a skill-based change in technology together with an increase in employment frictions can explain much of the observed variation in the unemployment rates for college and high school graduates, the education wage premium and the level of college participation. Their market segmentation is however only for college and high school graduates. We divide the market into three segments and we look at everybody regardless of their educational attainment.
There are mainly three types of theoretical models (assignment,search/matching,and human capital) in the literature to understand the 'mismatch'. Hartog (1997) 
Data
In order to get an empirical understanding of our analysis we construct an annual panel data set of occupation, education, wages, minimum required education for an occupation for a subset MSAs in the United States for the period that we use our data on. MSAs account for 84 percent of the aggregate population. However, for the general analysis we use a cross section version of the data. We can introduce observed hetereogenity through MSAs but for our current analysis this is unnecessary.
In order to understand the general distribution of occupation, education and wages we use American Community Survey (ACS) data for the period 2000-2010. Advantage of using this survey is that it is representative over the MSAs and we get to see the individual survey results rather than a general statistics for the MSA the individual is in. This way we are able to construct statistical distributions of occupations, education and wages. For minimum required education of an occupation we use Table 111 3 from Bureau of Labor Statistics, Education and training measurements for workers 25 years and older by detailed occupation for all the occupations is about 13.84 years. We define overeducation statistic here as the percentage of workers working in an occupation who has a higher degree than the minimum required level of education for that specific occupation. Proper match and undereducation is defined similarly.
We also divide both workers and jobs into three different categories in the following way:
• We define high skilled worker as someone who has at least 18 years of education. In other words, if a worker has at least masters degree then she will be counted as high skilled or highly educated worker.
• We define medium skilled worker as someone who has less than 18 years of education but more than 12 years. In other words, if a worker's educational attainment is less than a masters degree but more than high school degree then she will be counted as medium skilled worker.
• We define low skilled worker as someone whose education level is less than or equal to 12 years. In other words, if a worker's educational attainment is at most a high school degree then she will be counted as low skilled worker.
• High skill, medium skill and low skill jobs are defined similarly based on their minimum required education as defined by BLS.
Throughout the paper we are using the term high skill for people whose education level is high or for jobs that require workers with high level education. The other skill levels are used similarly. Of course we realize high skill doesn't necessarily mean high level of education.
However, for the purpose of our paper the language works fine. Tables 10, 11 and 12 in the appendix show the mean wages for various segments in the economy. Table 10 shows the mean wages for overeducated, properly matched and undereducated workers. In general there is an increasing trend in both segments. Table 11 shows the mean wages for jobs that require high skill, medium skill and low skill. Once again there is an increasing trend in all skill levels. We also see that jobs that require high skill pay significantly more than the others. Table 12 shows the mean wages for high skill workers, medium skill workers and low skill workers. We see the same pattern as we have seen in Table 11 . High skilled workers are on average getting paid significantly more than the other skills.
Motivation
Over the years as unemployment increases we see that overeducation levels also increase. But as a general trend we see that overeducation has been increasing even when unemployment was going down. Table 2 shows that there is a relationship between unemployment and overeducation, there is a high degree of correlation.
However, if we compare the general unemployment level given in Table 2 to percentage of overeducated workers we get a much clearer picture. The correlation between unemployment and overeducation is 0.686 indicating that unemployment has some explanatory power over overeducation levels observed in the market. Figure 1 shows the clear trend that both variables have. When we regress overeducation on unemployment we see that the coefficient of unemployment is significant at 95% level with an adjusted R 2 equal to 0.41. This means a decent amount of variation in overeducation can be explained by movements in the unemployment level as intuition suggests. But this also means that there is a significant amount of variation in overeducation that is not explained by variation in unemployment. We show that this can be explained by frictions in the job market. The market dynamics we describe in our model will constitute the frictions in the model. Indeed, the estimated overeducation and the overeducation seen in the data has a correlation of 95 percent. This is the motivation for our paper.
Our main task in this paper is to match the overeducation, proper match and undereducation columns in Table 2 . Table 2 is calculated using the overeducation, proper match and undereducation levels in the data for the years 2000-2010. Trend is clearly on the overeducation side. In order to match this data we use rates from Table 5 . Table 5 shows the percentage of workers with various skill levels in job types with various educational requirements. We can use this table as the probabilities we define in Section 3. For example, first column in Table 5 shows the probability of being employed in high skill job given that the worker is a high skilled worker.
We also need the mean wages for each group in each category. Table 6 gives us the mean wages of each worker skill level working in each job categories. For example the first column in Table 6 shows the mean wages of high skilled workers working in jobs that require high skill.
The Model
In this section we describe the model and provide its solution.
Environment
Consider three types of unemployed worker, k = A, B, C, each with unit measure in the economy. Types are different from each other according to their education level, namely years of schooling they attained. We assume that years of schooling for A is greater than B, and years of schooling for B is greater than C. Each type is initially unemployed and search for a job in one of the three markets, i = 1, 2, 3. These markets are different from each other according to the minimum required number of years of schooling for jobs. Market 1 requires more years of schooling than 2, and market 2 requires more years of schooling than 3. Unless a worker is employed in market 1, all workers search for a job regardless of their state (employed (E) or unemployed (U)), since a worker's goal is to find a better job in terms wages.
In other words, we allow them to search on the job, but a worker is restricted for searching only in one market at a particular period and there is no firing in any market. 6 More precisely,
• If a worker is unemployed and searches a job in market i, then this worker can only get a job offer from market i.
• If a worker is employed in market i(= 2, 3) and searches for a job, then this worker can 6 The reasoning behind this assumption is that in any given time period a worker focuses on a particular market and spends all her resources (time,money etc.) to search in this particular market.
only get an offer from market i − 1. In case of not getting offer this worker continue to work in market i.
• If a worker is employed in market 1, then this worker will be employed in market 1 forever, since there is no firing in any market.
Finally, we assume that cost of the search (c) and utility gain from leisure (b) offset each other, c = b. 
Type k's problem
In our model, an unemployed worker has to decide which market he wants to be in. In other words, this is basically a market choice problem. Since all information is publicly known, in case of employment workers have expectations for wage earnings conditional on type for all markets.
Throughout the paper V i s (k) denotes the discounted value of choosing market i, while in state s, for type k, where i = 1, 2, 3, k = A, B, C, s = E, U, and β is the discount factor. Hence, type k's optimal market decision problem is given by (k is initially in unemployed state);
where,
7 Qualitatively this assumption and the assumption of no firing has no effects on the results. The model can easily be extended by getting rid of these assumptions, however for our purposes there is no need for this extension.
Characterization of the Solution
Solution of the model is pretty standard, we recursively solve the value function maximization problems. The following equations characterizes the solutions:
Calibration and Model Results
Within the theoretical model, we assumed that workers are identical within each type. In other words, they simply face the same job offer probabilities and mean wages. However, when
we are performing the numerical simulations we assume that within each type, workers are heterogeneous in terms of their wage expectations for market i. When we fit the wage distri-butions for each category we actually see that they behave more like a statistical distribution that belongs to the Pearson family of distributions. This means we can use the four moments (mean,standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis) of each actual wage distributions from the data in order to obtain approximate wage distributions for each F k i . For type k in market i, we repeat the simulations 10000 times and for each simulation we draw a random variable from the obtained distribution for
Using the actual data (Table 5 ), we identify p k i (probability of getting an offer from market i conditional on type k) values from the data. In other words, table 5 represents the conditional probabilities of getting an offer in a market given one's skill. We set β = 0.96. All the parameters used in the simulations can be found in the appendix.
Given the heterogeneity of the wage expectations within every type, the model predicts the proportion of the overeducation, proper match and undereducation levels. We compare these results with the actual data. Finally, we repeat these exercises for the years 2000-2010.
The results are reported in Table 3 . We compare this table to the actual data that is reported in Table 2 . We are using Table 5 to match the probabilities we want in the model and Table 6 for wages in each category. Table 7 , 8 and 9 are used for standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis of the wage offers for each type of worker given the type of skill needed for the job respectively.
We can clearly see that our model captures the trend in each category. Figures 2,3 and   4 show the trends in each category and compares them to the trends in the actual data.
Correlation between estimated overeducation and overeducation in the data is %95. The model clearly fits the overeducation data very well. The fit is not as good for proper match and undereducation levels. However, our model still captures the trends in proper match and undereducation levels. We can see this in figures 3 and 4. 
Counterfactual Experiments
In this section we proceed to evaluate the impact of certain changes within the job market on overeducation, proper match and undereducation levels. There are three experiments that needs to be done in order to see the possible effects of changes in the job market on overeducation, proper match and undereducation. We will call the current results as Regime I. We carried out all these experiments using 2010 data. For the first experiment we only change the expected mean wages of type A. We increase the wages for type A in each market so that frictions within job markets decrease, this makes sense since type A on average should get higher wages regardless of the market they are working in. We call this experiment as Regime II. In the second experiment we change the job offer probabilities. We increase the probability of each type getting a job for their category, hence decreasing the frictions again. We call this experiment as Regime III. For the last experiment we combine the previous two experiments. We call this experiment as Regime IV, this should be the regime with the least amount of friction. Results of these counterfactual experiments are reported in Table 4 . We can clearly see that as we decrease the frictions, possible problem in each market, overeducation level goes down significantly. In all cases we kept the unemployment constant. This means even when the unemployment level is constant if the dynamics within the job markets change then we should expect mismatch levels change as well. If the frictions increase then mismatches increase, if the frictions decrease then mismatches decrease.
Conclusion
This paper develops a dynamic search model to explain mismatches in the job market. It uses the frictions within different job market categories to explain overeducation levels seen in the economy. The model we develop divides the job market into three categories, it also divides the prospective employees into three categories. Division is done based on educational requirements and educational attainments.
We use the CPS survey data that respondents report their wage, their occupation and their educational attainment. We then use the BLS provided minimum education required for the occupation they are working at. We must note that we don't observe which schools the respondents finished, we don't have the pedigree information. Also it's hard to talk about the quality of the education they received. However, we are interested in the mismatch at the macro level here. On average the unobserved quality difference should even out. The costbenefit analysis of the education mismatch should not be affected by such variables. Hence, the data we have is sufficient for an efficiency analysis.
The model primarily takes the job offer probabilities and mean expected wages in each category into account to explain mismatches. We then calibrate the model to data. We see that our model matches the overeducation levels very well. We then use counterfactual experiments to show that even where there is no change in the general unemployment levels, if the dynamics within the market change via job offer probabilities or expected mean wages then we should expect a huge change overeducation levels. If the frictions increase then we see that overeducation levels increase, if the friction levels decrease then we see that overeducation levels decrease. This means it's not only important to solve the general unemployment problem but it's also very important to solve any frictional issues that may arise within each job types. If job offer probabilities and relative wages within high skill jobs are not high enough, we should expect some of the high skilled workers move to lower skill jobs. The market needs to be able to create enough amount of jobs for each type with reasonable wages so that we don't see these kind of mismatches.
This study points out the inefficiencies in the job market regarding educational attainment. The next step would be to look at the causal effect of these mismatches on short term unemployment level. If an employee feels overqualified for the job he is working at he might be compelled to look for a better job that is more suited to his educational background. This may exacerbate the unemployment problem since part of the job market will be constantly on the prowl looking for a better match. The data we have shows that there is a pretty high correlation between yearly unemployment and lagged overeducation levels which is an indication that some of these overeducated people get back on the market looking for a job again. 
